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The
Internationalization
of Crimes

T

his chapter is concerned with the question of how
acts that would otherwise constitute domestic crimes
may also be considered international crimes. Many
international crimes actually encompass a constellation of
individual crimes. Some of these predicate crimes are unique
to international criminal law (ICL) or international humanitarian law (IHL), such as the crime of perfidy — making someone believe an individual is entitled to protected status under
the laws of war. Other predicate crimes have domestic law
analogs in the familiar crimes of assault, mayhem, and murder.
These domestic crimes are considered international crimes
when certain attendant circumstances are present. As a matter
of definitional structure, these attendant circumstances
usually appear in the chapeau* of the crime’s definition.
A major challenge to developing and codifying the field
of ICL has been to identify these attendant circumstances to

* Chapeau (‘‘hat’’) elements are circumstantial elements that apply uniformly
to a subsequent list of prohibited acts.
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fully distinguish international crimes from domestic ones. For
example, what attributes make an act of murder a crime against
humanity, a war crime, or genocide? A clear demarcation of
what crimes fall within international jurisdiction is important,
not only for academic or doctrinal reasons. For one, the
complete collapse of the distinction between international
and domestic crimes would be worrisome to states. It would
occasion the ceding of a high degree of jurisdictional sovereignty, as international crimes are often subject to international
and extraterritorial jurisdiction. These concerns could result in
the withdrawal of support for, and consent to, the regime of ICL,
which would be a major reversal of global policy trends. The
distinction between international and ordinary crimes also carries certain expressive implications — calling the imprisonment
of an individual the crime against humanity of unlawful detention carries greater stigma than a mere kidnapping or false
imprisonment allegation. Preserving a notion of international
crimes protects them from the semantic inflation that might
result if every abhorrent act were designated an international
crime. Notwithstanding the importance of retaining a distinction between international and domestic crimes, no grand analytic theory for this process has been identified. Instead, several
different approaches are apparent in distinguishing these two
bodies of penal law, as discussed next. Keep these approaches in
mind as you study the various substantive crimes in your course.

T HE J URISDICTIONAL A PPROACH
A primary, and facile, explanation for differentiating between
international and domestic crimes is jurisdictional: International
crimes are those crimes that are prosecuted before international
tribunals or pursuant to extraordinary jurisdictional forms. There
is no doubt that the distinction between international crimes and
‘‘ordinary’’ crimes has jurisdictional implications. For example,
108
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The Inter-National Approach

when an act rises to the level of an international crime it may be
prosecuted before an international tribunal if one exists with
jurisdiction over the act. Additionally, such an act may be subject
to certain extraordinary forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction by
states with no tangible nexus to the crime with respect to the
nationality of the perpetrator or victim or the place of commission. The authorization to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction
may be a function of customary international law or a treaty obligation. This jurisdictional explanation, however, raises a chickenand-egg problem: Are international crimes dubbed international
because they can be, or are, prosecuted before international tribunals, or are these crimes prosecuted before international
tribunals because they are international crimes?

T HE I NTER -N ATIONAL A PPROACH
The second approach we call the ‘‘inter-national’’ approach. Put
simply, this approach defines as international crimes those
crimes that transcend national boundaries and thus involve
the interests of more than one state. The relevant transnational
dimensions may relate to the nationality of the participants or
the place, or places, where the crime was committed. Historically, IHL only recognized war crimes as capable of being
committed against nationals of an opposing belligerent in an
international armed conflict. The positive law addressing
noninternational armed conflicts (which include, but are not
limited to, classic civil wars that pit compatriots against each
other) does not include any penal component. It is only
through the jurisprudence of the modern ICL tribunals that
a notion of war crimes outside of international armed conflict is
now fully recognized.
Although not requiring proof of the existence of an armed
conflict, the crime of aggression, as currently conceptualized,
does require some transnational element; there is no notion in
109
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international law of exclusively internal acts of aggression. This
inter-national approach does not account for all international
crimes, however. Although the definition of genocide and certain definitions of crimes against humanity recognize nationality as a ground for repression, both crimes can be committed
within the borders of a single state, even absent any crossborder effect. Indeed, crimes against humanity emerged as a
new international crime at Nuremberg precisely to reach conduct that would not constitute war crimes because the victim
and the perpetrator shared the same nationality.

I DENTITY A PPROACHES
Other approaches to delineating international from domestic
crimes focus on the identities of the perpetrators or victims.
A third approach we call the ‘‘state perpetrator’’ approach. State
action — shown either by way of a governmental policy or
through the conduct of state actors enjoying the protection
or authorization of a state — has often been cited as a potential
defining element of international crimes. Some historical definitions of crimes against humanity included a state action
requirement, although contemporary definitions are more
catholic in prohibiting action instigated or directed by any
organization or group as well as by an official government.
Such a limitation was specifically rejected in the case of genocide, as Article IV of the Genocide Convention makes clear
that genocide may be committed by private actors with no state
involvement.
Although the definitions of crimes against humanity in the
statutes of the ad hoc tribunals do not include reference to state
action, this limitation has partially snuck back into the definition
in the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in
Article 7(2)(a). That article defines the term ‘‘attack against
any civilian population’’ as a course of conduct ‘‘involving the
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multiple commission of acts . . . against any civilian population,
pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy
to commit such attack.’’ It remains to be seen what showing
will satisfy the requirement of an ‘‘organizational policy’’ before
the ICC. In addition, the ICC’s draft definition of aggression is
currently formulated in terms of state action: It must be shown
that a state committed an act of aggression as defined by the
ICC Statute. If such a showing is made, then individuals
who knowingly and intentionally order or otherwise participate
actively in the act of aggression can be prosecuted for their
contributions thereto. Current drafts of the crime of aggression
do not recognize the possibility of nonstate (or substate) actors
committing aggression. Thus acts of aggression trigger ICC
jurisdiction only if they are committed by a state actor.
This focus on the state as perpetrator reflects the pragmatic
consideration that crimes committed by, or at the behest of, a
state will not be adequately or uniformly punished within the
applicable domestic criminal systems and so must be penalized
and prosecuted at the international level. Indeed, ICL developed in part because states were unwilling (or unable) to prosecute breaches of international law committed by state
agents, often pursuant to a state policy. The abortive Leipzig
Trials at the close of World War I provide an apt example of
the way in which states can institutionalize impunity through
inaction and sham proceedings. Concerns about limiting
international jurisdiction to those crimes that are the least
likely to be pursued by an individual state partially explains
the absence in the ICC Statute of several crimes that are
the subject of well-subscribed-to multilateral treaties — such
as terrorism crimes, drug trafficking, and counterfeiting. The
ICC’s drafters assumed that such crimes are likely to be aggressively prosecuted in domestic proceedings as they are usually
committed by nonstate actors and threaten sovereign values.
A fourth, and inverse, approach for defining a crime as
international may be called the ‘‘protected group’’ approach.
111
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Many international crimes involve group-based repression.
The collective nature of these crimes may serve to enhance
their egregiousness and the culpability of the perpetrator, especially where groups are targeted on the basis of ‘‘suspect’’
classifications like race or ethnicity. Most saliently, the crimes
of genocide and persecution (an enumerated crime against
humanity) require that the victim be targeted on the basis of
his or her membership in a particular group or on discriminatory grounds. This approach does not explain all crimes defined
as international, as acts other than persecution can constitute
crimes against humanity if they are committed in the context of
a widespread or systematic attack against any sort of civilian
population, however defined. Interestingly in its first case, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) attempted to narrow the definition of crimes against
humanity by requiring discriminatory intent for all of its constituent acts.1 This ruling was overturned on appeal2 on the
ground that discriminatory intent is required for the crime of
persecution only.*
The definition of war crimes within the Geneva Conventions also incorporates this group-based approach. The penal
provisions of the Geneva Conventions are implicated only
when the victims fall within one of various categories of ‘‘protected person.’’ The Fourth Geneva Convention, for example,
recognizes certain acts (so-called grave breaches) as war crimes
only when they are committed against individuals who are not
protected by the other three Conventions (addressing the
* The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is an
exception to this approach. That statute requires a showing of discriminatory
intent (recognizing national, political, racial, or religious grounds) for all crimes
against humanity, not just persecution. In that statute, persecution as a crime
against humanity may only be committed on narrower (political, racial, and
religious) grounds. This peculiar discrepancy is probably a drafting oversight,
or an effort to conform the statute to the reality of the violence in Rwanda, rather
than an attempt to modify the definition of crimes against humanity under
international law.
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wounded, the shipwrecked, and prisoners of war), but who are
of a nationality different than that of the perpetrators. Specifically, protected persons are those persons who find themselves
‘‘at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever . . . in the
hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which
they are not nationals.’’3
The need to prove a nationality distinction between victim
and perpetrator has relaxed in the modern jurisprudence. In a
case involving individuals of different group identity (Serb and
Muslim) but of the same nationality (Bosnian), the ICTY
Appeals Chamber held that a key purpose of the Geneva
Conventions is to protect victims who are ‘‘different’’ from
the perpetrators, and thus interpreted ‘‘nationality’’ to include
ethnicity and other forms of group identification even when
the individuals were all of the same formal nationality. The
ICTY Appeals Chamber thus effectively redefined ‘‘protected
persons’’ in terms of the party to the conflict with which the
victims had ‘‘substantial relations more than . . . formal bonds’’
of citizenship.4

T HE P OLICY A PPROACH
Related to the state action requirement, and as a fifth
approach, certain definitions of international crimes include
a policy element as a way to distinguish international crimes
from domestic ones. In addition to including a gravity threshold, Article 8 of the ICC Statute concerning war crimes also
suggests a preference for prosecuting crimes ‘‘in particular’’
when committed ‘‘as part of a plan or policy. . . .’’ With respect
to crimes against humanity, the ICC Statute defines ‘‘attack’’ as
including a state or organizational policy to commit the attack.
The ICC definition of crimes against humanity thus seems to
require proof of a policy by virtue of the operative definition of
‘‘attack.’’ The customary international law definition of crimes
113
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against humanity, by contrast, does not appear to have such a
requirement, although proof of a policy is often valuable as an
evidentiary matter.

T HE N EXUS TO A RMED C ONFLICT
A PPROACH
The sixth approach we call the ‘‘nexus’’ approach. Under this
theory, a crime becomes international because of its relationship to an event with international implications, such as an
armed conflict. This bootstrapping is nicely illustrated with
the definition of crimes against humanity adopted by the
World War II tribunals. Much of the Nazi Holocaust involved
acts that, traditionally, would not have implicated international
law. The Holocaust primarily (although not exclusively)
involved perpetrators and victims of the same nationality or
of allied nationality, and occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the state of which those individuals were nationals.
The Allies conceived of the charge of crimes against humanity
to encompass the crimes of the Holocaust. They gave a nod to
then-existing international law by requiring that acts prosecuted as crimes against humanity have a nexus to another
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, namely either
crimes against peace (that is, aggression) or war crimes. As a
result of this definition of crimes against humanity, the
Nuremberg Tribunal expressly refused to prosecute individuals
for acts that occurred prior to September 1, 1939, the year in
which Germany launched World War II by invading Poland.
It is now well settled that crimes against humanity are
entirely autonomous from, and may be prosecuted absent, a
state of war, although it is unclear exactly when this development occurred. When subsequent definitions of crimes against
humanity were drafted, drafters struggled with identifying
internationalizing elements to replace the so-called war nexus.
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The less radical version of the nexus approach is illustrated
with war crimes, which require as a threshold element some
link to an armed conflict, either international or noninternational. Internal disturbances, riots, and the like, which exhibit
either an inadequate degree of intensity or whose opposing
parties are insufficiently organized, do not trigger IHL and,
by extension, the war crimes prohibitions. By contrast,
where a state of armed conflict exists, either international or
noninternational, crimes committed in connection therewith
can be classified as war crimes. The law continues to grapple
with exactly what sort of nexus between the crimes and the
armed conflict is required — for example, is mere temporality
enough, or must the acts be committed as part of, or in furtherance of, the armed conflict? Although the international
tribunals have made clear that such a nexus is required, they
have not clearly defined what relationship is required; rather,
they speak of the acts being ‘‘closely related to’’5 or exhibiting an
‘‘obvious link with’’6 the armed conflict. By contrast and
somewhat counterintuitively, the crime of aggression, which
remains under diplomatic discussion vis-à-vis the ICC, can
under most draft definitions be committed absent a fullscale armed conflict. Nonetheless, the actus reus of the
crime — which will likely include some combination of invasion, attack, occupation, bombardment, blockade, and so
on — often leads to, or occurs in connection with, armed
conflict.

T HE G LOBAL S TABILITY A PPROACH
The seventh approach we call the ‘‘global stability’’ approach.
A crime rises to the level of international concern because of
its effect on international public order and its ability to jeopardize the peace and security of the international community
as a whole (recognizing, of course, that the international
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community is far from monolithic). Violent acts of aggression,
efforts to exterminate entire populations, and even the largescale commission of war crimes can destabilize entire regions
and lead to international armed conflict, thus justifying a
collective and coordinated penal response. This is true
where the immediate effects are exclusively internal. Indeed,
early definitions of crimes against humanity drafted by the
International Law Commission in its effort to promulgate a
Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind used terms such as ‘‘widespread,’’ ‘‘massive,’’ or ‘‘systematic’’ to modify the actus reus of the crime and distinguish
international crimes from their domestic counterparts. An
early commentator at the end of the Nuremberg and Tokyo
proceedings justified the internationalization of those prosecutions as follows:
As a rule systematic mass action, particularly if it was authoritative, was necessary to transform common crime, punishable under municipal law, into a crime against humanity,
which thus became also a concern of international law.
Only crimes which either by their magnitude and savagery
or by their large number or by the fact that a similar pattern
was applied at different times and places endangered the
international community or shocked the conscience of mankind, warranted intervention by States other than that on
whose territory the crimes had been committed, or whose
subjects had been their victims.7

T HE D IGNITY A PPROACH
This quotation also suggests an eighth approach to defining
international crimes that we call the ‘‘dignity of humanity’’
approach. A crime becomes of international concern if it
exceeds a minimum threshold with respect to its gravity, or
if it otherwise violates certain fundamental values of the global
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community. Such crimes are considered to be of international
concern even if they do not formally transcend any international
borders, and even if they do not immediately threaten the stability of the international community. Rather, because of their
enormity, such crimes are of concern to all of humanity, and not
just to the immediate victims or even a single polity. In other
words, such crimes ‘‘signal a larger constituency.’’8 This concept
was expressed in the Moscow Declaration in which the United
States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union first articulated their two-part prosecutorial strategy for Nazi officers and
party members: trials in the locus delicti for lower level defendants and some sort of joint prosecution of those individuals
whose offenses had no particular geographical localization.
More recently, Article 1 of the ICC Statute limits the exercise
of jurisdiction to ‘‘the most serious crimes of international
concern.’’9 Likewise, the war crimes provision (Article 8) contains threshold language focusing the jurisdiction of the Court
with respect to war crimes ‘‘in particular’’ when they are committed ‘‘as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.’’
Under this approach, the principle of universal jurisdiction
can be conceptualized as the delegation of jurisdictional
authority to any state that is able to obtain jurisdiction over
a hostis humani generis — enemy of all humankind. This idea is
also contained in the very lexicon of one of the central ICL
crimes: the crime against humanity. Thus, genocide or crimes
against humanity committed exclusively within the territorial
jurisdiction of one state now clearly trigger the ICL regime.
Defining a crime as international because of its gravity
does, however, present certain challenges. Using a concept
of gravity to identify international crimes is somewhat
subjective where harm caused by criminal action may be
incommensurable. In addition, gravity alone may not be sufficient to exclude domestic crimes, which can be horrific in their
effects. In any case, most modern definitions of international
crimes allow for the prosecution of single or isolated criminal
117

4

The Internationalization of Crimes

acts, so long as they are committed within the context required
by the definition of the offense. To prosecute an individual for
crimes against humanity, for example, the criminal act must
have been committed within the context of a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population with knowledge
of the attack. These threshold concepts of ‘‘widespread’’ and
‘‘systematic’’ now modify the attendant attack rather than the
constitutive offense, the effects of which may be more modest
in their impact. The prohibition against war crimes requires
only the existence of an armed conflict, and a single war crime
can constitute an international crime, even absent any serious
impact. Even with the crime of genocide, a single act of violence against a protected group may constitute genocide at a
theoretical level. As such, threshold provisions like those in
Articles 1 and 8 of the ICC Statute are more jurisdictional
than definitional.

T HE M ENS R EA A PPROACH
A ninth, and final, approach to delineating international crimes
focuses on the motive or intent of the perpetrator. For example,
the definition of crimes against humanity contains two mens
rea elements. The first is the mens rea element associated with
the constitutive crime, such as intent to kill with respect to
murder. The second is found in the definition’s chapeau and
requires a showing that the individual knew that the act of
intentional murder was part of a widespread or systematic
attack against a civilian population. (See Article 7(1) of the
ICC Statute.) This second-order mens rea element helps to
internationalize the crime by connecting the act to a larger
campaign of violence or persecution.
Terrorism crimes are also often defined in terms of the
perpetrator’s subjective motive in committing the crime, with
motive being defined as the reason that people engage in crime.
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Many terrorism definitions focus on the perpetrator’s goal of
terrorizing the civilian population; coercing or inducing a government to do or abstain from doing some act; disrupting
public services; or otherwise achieving some political, military,
ethnic, ideological, or religious goal. Criminal acts that do not
involve these particular motives are not prosecutable as acts of
terrorism. This reliance on motive as an internationalizing element is somewhat unique in the penal law as most offenses do
not include motive as a substantive element of the crime.

C ONCLUSION
In the end, one is left with the impression that the different
international crimes have been designated as such for different
reasons. This heterogeneity in many ways reflects the fact that
ICL has historically evolved along disparate strands that are
only today converging in a handful of centralized institutions,
most notably the ICC, and in the world’s domestic penal codes.
In general, the chapeau of each crime’s definition is where one
often finds clues to a justification for internationalization. For
war crimes, the key overarching element is the existence of an
armed conflict. Crimes against humanity exist where there is a
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.
The unifying theme for the crime of genocide is the targeting of
a protected group. Both crimes against humanity and genocide
also include second-order mens rea elements that apply to
the attendant circumstances rather than to the enumerated
crimes. As a result of these additional elements, the prosecution of an international crime requires the introduction of
evidence that satisfies more elements than would normally be
required for a domestic prosecution. This, in turn, contributes
to the length and complexity of modern international trials.
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